Introduction
Developed countries across the globe face health expenses rising structurally at a higher pace than national incomes. 1 Decentralization to lower levels of government is one of the strategies that central governments may deploy to curb spending. 2 This strategy is not without its risks,
though. Externalities such as interaction with nationally funded programs may induce subnational governments to underprovide health care, or undesired interjurisdictional variation in the level of provision may arise. These risks may be addressed through the grant system. 3 An important question is therefore how this system should be designed.
The use of unconditional block grants incentivizes subnational governments to curb spending and it imposes little administrative burden. However, it also limits the degree to which the central government can control decentralized health care provision through the grant systemat least in the conventional economic view, which holds that for grants to have a substantial stimulative effect, they should be made conditional on decentralized spending. Yet empirical evidence indicates that the stimulative effect of grants with a lump sum nature may also be large. This phenomenon -money sticks where it hits -has been dubbed the flypaper effect.
The upshot is that conditioning of grants may not be necessary for the central government to retain some control over decentralized health care provision.
The tendency in the United States has been to reduce conditionality and in particular matching provisions in grants to the states. The reform of the welfare system in the 1990s involved the conversion of matching grants into block grants, notwithstanding the externalities involved in decentralized redistribution. 4 The House of Representatives has recently proposed to convert
Medicaid into a block grant, although opponents fear that resources will be targeted away 1 Chernew and Newhouse (2012) provide an overview and discussion. 2 Since World War II many European countries have decentralized health care policy to lower levels of government (Tediosi et al. 2009 , Mosca 2006 . For instance, in the Nordic countries administrative, managerial, and substantial political and fiscal responsibilities have been decentralized to municipalities. In Spain and Italy health care responsibilities have been decentralized to the regional level, yet fiscal responsibility has not been decentralized fully. (Tediosi et al. 2009, Rico and León, 2005) . 3 The externalities that arise when redistributive policies are decentralized are discussed in e.g., Pauly (1973) , Boadway and Wildasin (1984) and Wildasin (1991) . Essentially, by underproviding redistributive services, subnational governments externalize costs through two channels: needy households may move to other places in which provision is more generous and even if they stay, residents in other places may experience a utility cost when preferences for redistribution transcend jurisdictional boundaries. These externalities may be addressed through matching grants, where the matching rate corresponds to the magnitude of the externality. 4 Brueckner (2000) reviews the debate on funding welfare provision in the United States. See Blank (2002) for a broad evaluation of the reform.
from individuals or communities with the greatest need toward those with greater political influence. 5 Block grants are already used to fund decentralized health care provision in several other countries. 6 This paper studies how an unconditional block grant affects the local provision of care in the Netherlands. The particular type of care we consider is assistance in daily housekeeping activities (ADHA), which enables people with physical or mental health problems to stay in their home environments. Partly motivated by the need to curb expenses, this task was decentralized to the local level in 2007. Municipalities were funded by an unconditional block grant and the central government explicitly allowed spending of this grant on other items, in order to provide a maximum incentive to cut costs. However, this grant structure also induces a risk of underprovision, as ADHA is likely to interact with other types of home care and institutional long-term care, which remained a central government responsibility.
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Furthermore, amongst the Dutch, there is a general dislike of intermunicipal variation in the level of health care provision. 8 A strong connection between municipal spending levels and grants determined on the basis of local needs measures would mitigate such concerns.
Our identification strategy exploits the gradual introduction of formula-based equalization.
The grant was initially set at pre-existing spending levels, yet gradually evolved into an equalizing grant based on the variation in spending needs that could be explained by socioeconomic and demographic variables. The equalization scheme was revised in 2011. We test for the potential endogeneity of these two reforms by identifying on each of them separately and verify that results are unaffected. Furthermore, we verify robustness for entering vote shares, needs indicators or pre-existing spending levels -a proxy for local preferences -as controls.
We find that the unconditional block grant has stimulated the decentralized provision of care
moderately. An exogenous one euro increase raises local expenditure by twenty to fifty cents.
5 Dilger and Boyd (2014) provide an overview of the political debate on block granting Medicaid in the United States. 6 Block grants are used to fund decentralized health care provision in Denmark, Finland, Italy, Norway, Spain and Sweden (Rico and Leon 2005; Kim et al, 2009) . 7 As health care is redistributive in nature, decentralization may also induce underprovision through other channels, as discussed in Footnote 3. 8 On the basis of a questionnaire, Allers et al. (2013) report that the majority of respondents view intermunicipal differences in the level of social services, such as health care, as socially undesirable and that tasks should remain a central government responsibility if decentralization gives rise to such differences.
Municipalities that receive more grants as a result of the reform also provide more hours of ADHA per capita. Substitution between basic and more advanced types of assistance turns out to be an important margin of adjustment. Hence, conditioning of grants does not appear to be required for the central government to retain a moderate degree of control over the decentralized provision of care.
The wider literature on the stimulative effect of grants on spending has produced broad support for the flypaper effect. While causal interpretation of some of the early work is troubled by identification concerns, several more recent papers that convincingly isolate the impact of exogenous changes in grants also find a considerable impact on spending. 9 This effect is reported for aggregate subnational spending (e.g. Dahlberg et al. 2008; Lundqvist 2015) , as well as for spending on particular items (e.g. Evans and Owens 2007; Singhal 2008 percent of the elderly that are 90 (Pommer et al., 2009 ).
Organization of ADHA before the decentralization
Before the decentralization to municipalities in 2007, the delivery of ADHA was organized by the central government under the Dutch Exceptional Medical Expense Act (EMEA), a national insurance scheme that covered all inhabitants of the Netherlands for long-term care services. 11 EMEA also covered more intensive home care, such as 'personal care' and nursing, and institutional care.
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A separate government assessment body determined the eligibility for EMEA care, including ADHA. On the basis of national guidelines, this body prescribed both the number of hours of ADHA a household was entitled to and the type (basic or advanced). The prescribed number of hours and type of ADHA would depend on the needs and characteristics of the 10 So, for example, basic ADHA could consist of cleaning the fridge, but a provider of advanced ADHA would also check expiry dates of products in this fridge and make an overview of stocks that need replenishing. 11 EMEA also covered other health series, such as specialized hospital services. 12 Personal care consists of assistance in daily activities such as preparations of meals or assistance in taking a shower. People who give personal care sometimes perform activities that typically fall under advanced ADHA.
household. 13 Nevertheless, there was considerable geographical variation in the uptake of ADHA that could not be accounted for on the basis of the sociodemographic composition of the populations. 14 Eligible households could choose between in-kind delivery by pre-selected suppliers -the most common option -and a cash benefit that allowed them to contract a health care supplier of their own choice. Users bore part of the expenses themselves through a user fee.
People opting for in-kind delivery obtained ADHA through one of the 32 'health care purchasing agencies' that were responsible for the acquisition of EMEA care within their geographical boundaries. 15 These agencies determined which suppliers were allowed to deliver care in their region and they negotiated about price and quantity of care delivered by each supplier. Purchasing agencies were funded by the central government. There was a cap on the total amount of expenses the central government would reimburse -introduced in
2004, but additional funds were provided if the budget was exceeded due to exceptional circumstances.
Because purchasing agencies got by and large refunded for the health care expenditures made, their incentive to economize on expenses was weak. This, together with ageing of the population, resulted in a substantial growth in EMEA expenditures. Between 1991 and 2005, EMEA expenditures increased from 2.9 percent of GDP to 4.6 percent of GDP (CPB, 2005) .
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This trend prompted the central government to decentralize the provision of ADHA to municipalities (Tweede Kamer, 2004) . At that time, expenditures on ADHA were (and are) small compared to GDP (about 0.3 percent), but they formed a significant part of expenditures on long term health services covered by EMEA (about 6.8 percent).
13 For instance, household requiring cleaning of their home would receive between one and 1.5 hours of ADHA. Typical activities that should be done in this timeframe are cleaning up after meals, doing the dishes, dusting and changing bedsheets. Households with children older than twelve receive less hours of ADHA, as teenagers are expected to clean their own room. Households who need assistance in grocery shopping would receive one hour of ADHA per week for this task. This could be extended to two times one hour per week when the household has children younger than thirteen or when the household is large. Household are eligible for an additional half an hour of ADHA if the distance to shops is large. See CIZ (2006). 14 Geographical variation in health care utilization is a well-known phenomenon -see Skinner (2012) for a discussion of causes and consequences. One potential explanation in the context of ADHA provision is that regional purchasing agencies acquired ADHA largely on the basis of uptake in the past, rather than an estimate of current needs (CEBEON, 2005 to what the regional purchasing agencies paid (Pommer et al., 2009 ).
Users of ADHA continued to have a choice between in-kind delivery and cash benefit. This cash benefit in general equals about 75 percent of the in-kind ADHA expenditures they are eligible for (Botter, 2010) . Hence, providing ADHA using cash benefits is cheaper for municipalities than providing this assistance in-kind. This provides municipalities with a financial incentive to stimulate the use of cash benefits, although easy access to cash benefits may increase demand for ADHA and controlling the quality of ADHA services bought with a cash benefit is difficult (VNG, 2011) .
Municipalities could also charge a user fee and usually set the maximum amount they are allowed to charge. This maximum is determined by the central government and depends on income and the composition of the household. User fees cover about 20 per cent of ADHA expenses on average, but they can be substantial relative to the price of ADHA -especially for non-elderly households with high incomes. Hence, these households more often contract home help without municipal interference -either formal services that by cleaning companies or services that are offered by individuals (Pommer et al., 2009 ).
In order to provide a maximum incentive to curb expenses, the central government funded municipal ADHA provision though a new block grant. While labelled 'grant for social support', this grant was unconditional and spending it on other items was explicitly allowed (Department of the Interior, 2006). 17 It amounted to about ten percent of the (total) general purpose grant municipalities received from central government, which is the major source of funding for municipalities in the Netherlands. Hence, the introduction of the grant for ADHA provided a substantial increase in grant money that could be spend unconditionally.
The flypaper effect
Although the grant for ADHA is unconditional, the sizeable empirical literature on the flypaper effect predicts it to be spent mainly on ADHA. However, as noted in the previous section, the flypaper effect is not an empirical law and it likely depends on the institutional context. One relevant feature in this respect is that in the Netherlands, municipal tasks and budgets are typically divided over different aldermen. ADHA is usually part of a portfolio that also comprises other social policies. Aldermen are assigned a budget and if it is exceeded, funds have to be reallocated and the alderman responsible for finances has to agree. This constitutes a barrier which enforces budgetary discipline on spending within each portfolio.
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A flypaper effect arises when these budgets are based on central government grants. In particular, the budget a priori allocated to ADHA would typically be based on the grant for social support, which may well be the most accurate ex ante estimate of ADHA expenses available to a municipality. 19 This explanation accords well with the behavioral explanation put forward by Hines and Thaler (1995) that voters and governments tend to think in nonfungible budgets. 20 Note, however, that as portfolios are generally broader than ADHA provision, alderman may also accommodate changes in this grant through changes in expenses on other items.
A second feature that bears on the strength of the flypaper effect in our institutional setting is the considerable leeway that municipalities have in determining eligibility for ADHA and the number of hours. They may also influence expenditure through substitution of the type of assistance. Basic ADHA costs about 20 euro per hour and for advanced ADHA, a ten percent premium is paid. 21 Moreover, municipalities negotiate the costs of providing ADHA through the procurement process, they set user fees and may also influence the use of cash benefits.
This considerable range of instruments enables municipalities to adjust provision and spending levels to grant changes, which is necessary condition for a flypaper effect to arise.
Reforms in the grant for ADHA
The grant that municipalities received for ADHA was subject to two reforms that changed the distribution of the grant, but let the total amount of grant money distributed largely unaffected. As we will derive our identification from these reforms, this section provides more background. (2008) and Pommer et al. (2009) . 24 We scale by dividing though the aggregate counterfactual grant amounts over all municipalities and then multiplying by the total budget in 2007.
revealing a significant negative correlation. Municipalities who gained the most from the first reform were particularly negatively affected. Figure 4 illustrates that the combination of both reforms targets municipalities even more precisely with regard to initial expenditure levels.
Identification strategy
Equation (1) 
This specification accounts for all time-invariant determinants of municipal ADHA provision levels through first-differencing. The constant captures shocks that are common to all municipalities, such as the change in the aggregate budget. EMEA-region specific effects E r are included to control for any variation due to former policies of the regional purchasing agencies. For instance, municipalities in an EMEA-region that used to be more lenient might find it easier to impose restrictions on the use of home health care, which could confound our estimate of the impact of the change in grants. The EMEA-region specific effects also control for any changes in the provision of other types of home care and institutional long-term care, which were still allocated at the level of regional purchasing agencies in our period of observation, as some of these types of care may have acted as substitutes for ADHA.
Estimation of Equation (1) with ordinary least squares (OLS) may produce biased results for a number of reasons. One obvious concern is that ΔG i is partly determined by changes in needs indicators that also influence the demand for ADHA. Changes in local sociodemographic composition that drive both changes in grants and changes in the provision of ADHA bias the OLS estimate of β upwardly. We deal with this particular threat to our identification by instrumenting ΔG i with the change in grants that would result when needs indicators were held constant at their 2005 levels -i.e. Reforms 1 and 2, as defined in the previous section.
Hence, the variation in the change of grants that drives our identification is the reform of the grant allocation and not the change in local demand for ADHA.
Reforms in the allocation of grants, alas, may also be endogenous. There are several papers that derive identification from grant allocation formulas and the need to account for their endogeneity is a common thread in this literature. 25 In particular, Knight (2002) demonstrates that the allocation of grants may be influenced by local preferences for public spending and that a failure to account for this endogeneity biases estimates of the flypaper effect. To the extent that preferences are constant over time and their effect is already incorporated in provision levels, first-differencing removes this source of endogeneity. However, as municipalities became responsible for ADHA only in 2007, it is plausible that some tailoring of provision to local preferences took place during our period of observation. A correlation of these preferences with the grant reform would then lead to bias.
Our strategy for dealing with this concern consists of two main elements. In the first place, we exploit the fact that after the gradual introduction of the original grant formula in the period
The second main element in our strategy for dealing with potential endogeneity of the grant reform is entering control variables in Equation (1) that relate as closely as possible to these concerns. In particular, we enter vote shares to left-wing, Christian-democratic and local parties as controls for local preferences. These controls pick up the bias that would arise for example when a reform favors left-leaning municipalities that are in the process of tailoring provision to a higher preference for home care. Alternatively, we enter needs indicators at their 2005 levels. These controls pick up the bias that would arise for example when a reform favors municipalities with more elderly or poor inhabitants that are in the process of tailoring provision to a higher preference for home care. Moreover, we also verify robustness of our findings to controlling for changes in vote shares and needs indicators.
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Another threat to identifying the causal effect of grants on the provision of ADHA is that the reform of the grant allocation coincides with the decentralization of this type of home care.
This major policy shift may have induced changes in the provision of ADHA at the municipal level that correlate with the reform-induced change in grants and hence bias our estimate of the flypaper effect. Although our general strategy for dealing with endogeneity of the reform already provides a check, we deal with this specific threat in two additional ways. In the first place, we exploit the fact that the 2011 revision of the grant allocation formula occurred four years after the decentralization and that it did not concur with any major policy change. As a second check, we enter expenses on ADHA made within the boundary of each municipality in 2005 as a control. Perhaps the most obvious source of bias from concurrence of the grant reform and the decentralization of ADHA is that for municipalities in which predecentralization expenditure levels were highest, it was easiest to cut back expenses once they became for responsible ADHD. As seen in Figures 2 and 4, these were also the municipalities that saw their grants reduced by the largest per capita amount. Hence, it may have been the relative ease with which expenses on ADHA could be reduced that has driven both the change As a final test for the possibility that our estimate of the flypaper effect is driven by a subgroup of municipalities not accounted for in one of our other robustness checks, we estimate the separate effects of positive and negative changes in grants.
Data
We municipalities reports zero expenditures on ADHA, whereas the user data reveals that ADHA has been delivered in all municipalities, so we drop these municipalities from our sample.
Our other measures of municipal ADHA provision are based on administrative records from the Central Administration Office (CAO) -the office that collects all user fees and transfers them to municipalities, and therefore is highly reliable. The CAO registers both the type and the hours of ADHA delivered in-kind. We categorize ADHA into basic and advanced assistance. Eight municipalities had to be dropped from the analysis as they did not consistently record utilization of ADHA. 29 In total, this leaves us with a regression sample of 380 municipalities for which both expenses and hours of ADHA are consistently measured in each year. Summary statistics for this sample are reported in Table 1 . On average, the municipalities in our sample spent almost 100 euro per capita on ADHA and they provided The CAO also records how many persons use a cash benefit instead of ADHA in-kind. This information allows us to verify whether the reforms induced a change in the use of cash benefits. Table 1 shows that the share of the population that uses a cash benefit has increased over time. Furthermore, we observe the total amount of user fees for ADHA that municipalities received in 2008 and 2013. 30 The average user fee is low, about 6 euro per hour in 2013, yet it has increased by about 2 (real) euro per hour between 2007 and 2013 (see Table 1 ). This information allows us to verify whether the reforms induced a change in user fees, which in turn may have affected the uptake of ADHA Data on the block grant is recorded from overviews of the municipality grant system that have been published by the national administration, see Department of the Interior (2007; 2014) .
Note that with an average amount of almost 94 euro per capita, the grant received is somewhat lower than reported expenditures on ADHA (see Table 1 ). We use the grant receipts and underlying allocation formulas, in combination with the realization of needs 29 These municipalities moved from a system based on entitlements to inputs (hours of ADHA) to a system based on entitlements to outcomes. Hence, in 2007 they assigned clients a certain number of ADHA, yet in 2013 they assigned clients the right to 'a clean house'. As a result CAO no longer registers the provided hours of ADHA in these municipalities. Finally, we add several control variables that might be correlated with the grant reform and provision of ADHA: the share of elderly people, the average income, the share of minority groups, the mortality rate and population density. These data are obtained from Statistics
Netherlands. We use data on municipal elections provided by the Electoral Council (2014) Neither the OLS estimates in the first column, nor the estimates identified on either of the two reforms separately in the final two columns, differ statistically significantly from our baseline estimates in Column 2. Similarity of the OLS and IV estimates indicates that the bias through correlation of changes in grants and ADHA provision with changes in needs is negligible. The finding that our results are robust to identifying on either of the two reforms separately is an important validation of our empirical approach. The statistical insignificance of the reforms that are included in the second stage also supports the assumption that their impact on expenditure runs entirely through the change in grants and not through other channels. It should be noted that our estimate of the effect on expenditure in Column 4 is quite imprecise, which limits the strength of this test, yet the same limitation does not apply to the estimates on the more accurately measured number of hours.
In all IV-equations the instrument is highly relevant, as indicated by the Kleibergen-Paap Fstatistic. Also, in the first stage reported in Panel C, parameter estimates are significant at the one percent level and close to one. 34 Thus a change in our instrument with one euro leads to a change in grant of about one euro. This also validates our identification strategy, as an estimated parameter different from one would imply that part of the variation in grants would be due to other factors that correlate with the reform and that might be endogenous (see e.g. 33 Assuming an income elasticity of demand for ADHA of one, an increase in the grant for ADHA by one euro should result in an increase in ADHA expenditures by 0.3 cent. See e.g. Inman (2008) . 34 For completeness, the first column of Appendix Table A1 shows results based on a reduced form specification in which the change in expenditure is directly regressed on both reforms. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the effect of the first and second reform is equal to our preferred estimate in Table 2 . Lundqvist, 2015) . The high R-squared of the first stage regressions indicates that most of the variation in changes in grants comes from the reforms and not from changes in needs indicators, which evolve only slowly over time (see also Table 1 ). This probably also explains the strong similarity of OLS and IV results. Table 3 reform and thus biases our findings. However, the estimated impact of the change in grants is almost identical to our baseline estimates in Table 2 , so this does not turn out to be the case.
Appendix Table A2 demonstrates that controlling for changes in needs indicators between 2007 and 2013 leaves our findings unaffected as well.
The third column in Table 3 shows that our results are robust to including pre-decentralization expenditure levels on ADHA in 2005, which may pick up the ease with which budgets cuts in the subsequent period could be realized.
As a further check for possible bias through the concurrence of the grant reform with the decentralization of ADHA, Table 4 presents estimation results for the 2010 -2013 period.
The first column is based on OLS and Reform 2 is used as an instrument in the second column, while Reform 1 is entered as a control variable. Otherwise, this table has the same setup as Table 2 . Neither estimates of the effect on expenditure nor of the effect on number of hours differs statistically significantly from our baseline estimates, although as in Column 4 of Table 2 , estimates for expenditure are quite imprecise. Moreover, the similarity of these estimates with Column 4 in Table 2 indicates that most of the adjustment to the 2011 revision of the grant allocation formula took place in the period 2010 -2013 and not in preceding years, thus countering concerns about bias through anticipatory municipal behavior.
As a final check on the identification of our baseline estimates in Table 2 , Appendix Table A3 shows results for specifications in which the effect of grants is allowed to differ between municipalities who saw grants increase due to the reform and those who faced a decrease in grant receipts. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that positive and negative shocks have a similar effect on expenditures. This provides a further indication that the overall effect is not driven by a subgroup of municipalities, such as the losers from the grant reform.
Adjustment channels
Results in the previous section indicate that municipalities have used their leeway in determining eligibility and hours to adjust expenses on ADHA to changes in grants. This section explores further channels, with a focus on the substitution between basic and advanced ADHA -the main difference being the required level of coordination of housekeeping tasks. Table 5 Table 2 and hence suppressed. In our baseline specification in Column 2, the impact of changes in grants on changes in hours of basic assistance is statistically insignificant, whereas the impact on changes in hours of advanced assistance is statistically significant at the 1 percent level and quantitatively comparable to the baseline effect in Table 2 . This indicates that the change in hours of ADHA reported in Table   2 is predominantly driven by the impact of grants on the provision of ADHA of the advanced type.
The sensitivity checks reported in the third and fourth columns of this table indicate that these estimates should be considered with caution. Identification on Reform 2 produces estimates that are statistically distinct from estimates identified on Reform 1, or on the sum of both reforms. Apparently, omitted variables correlate with one of these reforms and with changes in the provision of basic and advanced assistance. 35 As a further check, we estimate the effect on change in hours of basic and advanced ADHA for the period 2010 -2013 in Table 6 . The IV results in Column 2 do not differ statistically significantly from those in Column 2 in Table 5 . Hence, while the results for adjustments in the composition of ADHA with respect to the type of care are somewhat mixed, the stimulative effect of grants turns out consistently larger for advanced ADHA than for basic ADHA. This indicates that substitution between these types of assistance has been an important margin of adjustment.
We also verify the role of cash benefits and user fees as a channel of adjustment. In-kind delivery may have been substituted for cash benefits in response to a change grant, so that the impact of grants on the overall number of hours of ADHA per capita is overestimated.
However, Appendix Table A4 shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between the change in grants and the change in the percentage of people in a municipality who receive ADHA in cash rather than in kind. This result is robust to identification on the first reform, the second reform or the sum of both reforms. Hence, cash benefits do not appear to have been substituted for in-kind service delivery in response to changes in grants on a substantial scale.
The final channel considered here is that municipalities may have altered the user fee for ADHA in response to changes in grants. A negative relationship between the change in the average fee per hour of ADHA and the change in grant would suggest that part of the grant money is transferred to users of ADHA in the form of lower contributions. Appendix Table   A5 presents no evidence in favor of such a relationship, irrespective of the reform used for identification. Hence, it appears that user fees have not been substantially adjusted in response to a change in grant either. 35 The third and fourth columns of Appendix Table A1 shows results based on a reduced form specification in which the change in hours per capita of basic and advanced ADHA is directly regressed on both reforms, which are consistent with results reported in Table 5 .
Conclusions and implications for policy
We exploit the gradual introduction of formula-based equalization to identify the effect of exogenous changes in an unconditional block grant on local provision of ADHA in the Netherlands. A one euro increase in grants raises local expenditure by twenty to fifty cents.
Adjustments occur through the number of hours as well as through substitution between basic and more advanced types of assistance. These empirical findings are robust to a range of sensitivity checks.
If municipalities base the provision of care by and large on the need-based funds they receive from the central government -even if these funds are provided as a lump sum -then underprovision and undesired interjurisdictional variation in provision levels may be less of a concern. We find a rather moderate impact of grants on provision, which suggests that the flypaper effect may not be relied upon to fully counter concerns about local provision levels.
Whether or not alternative policy measures are necessary depends on their effectiveness and on the magnitude of externalities.
A moderate flypaper effect, however, also means that the incentive to curb expenses is only moderately hampered by stickiness of grants to budget categories. Hence, funding decentralized care through an unconditional block grant may indeed help to reduce overall health care expenses, which is good news in view of concerns about its large and rising share of national income. Unconditional block grants have other advantages. They give subnational governments leeway in the allocation of funds over programs and instruments, while minimizing the administrative burden. Our findings indicate that the central government may reap these advantages without fully giving up control over decentralized health care provision.
Empirical evidence on the prevalence of flypaper effects in the health care domain is rare.
Although our finding naturally depend on the Dutch institutional context, they may inform policy debates about decentralization and funding of care in other countries. After all, the Netherlands is far from the only country considering decentralization as remedy to sizeable and rising health expenses.
Appendix: The grant allocation formulas
This appendix provides more detail on the grant allocation formulas used in 2010 and 2013.
In Appendix Table A6 we The allocation formulas were constructed using the so-called "analysis of differences". The idea behind this method is that municipal costs for the provision of ADHA can be divided into costs that are the result of exogenous or endogenous cost drivers. An allocation formula is constructed based on the exogenous costs and exogenous cost drivers only. Municipalities have been grouped according to income (high, low) and share of elderly (high, low) and relevant cost drivers and their weights have been selected by their ability to explain cost differences within and between these groups of municipalities (see Huigsloot, 2007) . The allocation formulas have been presented to municipalities before officially being published. 37 As an example, the weight for population size was 0. Nonetheless, we use it as a control because provision of ADHA is believed to more expensive in remote areas with low population density because of travel costs. 
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